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It is common to think of medical and ethical modes of thought as different in kind. In such 
terms, some clinical situations are made more complicated by an additional ethical 
component. Against this picture, we propose that medical and ethical modes of thought are 
not different in kind but merely different aspects of what it means to be human. We further 
propose that clinicians are uniquely positioned to synthesise these two aspects without prior 




1. What is the additional ethical component? 
It is common to think of medical and ethical modes of thought as different in kind, with 
different criteria for expertise. Thought of in such terms, some clinical situations are made 
more complicated by an additional ethical component. Understanding this additional 
component requires an additional way of thinking which requires new training. It is not 
enough to be a doctor; you must be a trained ethicist too. 
Let us begin with this picture of the ethical as an additional component that requires a 
different kind of expertise. We will do this by considering two answers to the question, (Q) 
“What are you thinking about, doc?”: (A1) “Whether Mary has pneumonia.” (A2) “Whether 
Jim should tell his children about his diagnosis of autosomal dominant polycystic kidney 
disease.” While both answers specify decisions to be made, the first seems to be about a 
medical decision, regarding a diagnosis, while the second, in light of our opening remarks, 
seems more complicated. What does the second involve that the first does not? We might 
answer, “It involves a decision the patient must make based on what they value.” 
So, we might be here tempted to invoke an old classification: the first answer is to do 
with fact, the second with value. Thus, the additional ethical component seems to be 
“anything to do with value”. In these terms, we might further be tempted to suppose that we 
have here a contrast between an example in which there is an objectively right – medical – 
answer to whether Mary has pneumonia, but no objectively right – ethical – answer to 
whether Jim should tell his children about his diagnosis of autosomal dominant polycystic 
kidney disease. The latter, it might be thought, is a question of value judgement; some might 
even say it is a registration of personal preference. From the perspective of medical ethics, it 
is commonly held that one of the clinician’s tasks in this situation is to interpret Jim’s goals 
and values (perhaps balanced against the goals and values of society) in order to help him 
make a good decision. Because there is purportedly no objectively right answer, clinicians 
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can find these ethical issues messy and unresolvable [1,2]. At this stage, anyone with a 
passing interest in philosophy may well be seeking to interject with the philosopher’s “but!”. 
What we have hitherto referred to as common is in reality no longer so. The dichotomy we 
have briefly laid out is not one that is widely endorsed in the philosophical literature beyond 
bioethics narrowly construed. Values, rather than being mere questions of personal 
preference, are generally considered integral to the process of knowing [3–7]. 
Let us return to the seemingly simple case of Mary’s diagnosis – example (1). After 
asking Mary to describe her symptoms, her GP, Dr Clarke, takes her temperature and 
measures her blood oxygen levels with an oximeter. These results may well suggest that 
Mary has pneumonia but Dr Clarke cannot be sure; the aetiological agent responsible for 
community acquired pneumonia is only established in under one-third of cases. Nevertheless, 
Dr Clarke’s clinical judgement is that Mary has low severity pneumonia and prescribes a 
course of Amoxicillin to be started straight away. For patients of Mary’s age, pneumonia can 
be dangerous so Dr Clarke wants to make sure this does not develop into something more 
severe that could need hospital admission. Reflecting on this situation, we can start to see that 
thinking of Mary’s diagnosis as merely an objective fact might not be so straightforward. 
Given in a primary care setting Dr Clarke cannot easily (and does not need to) establish 
the aetiological agent responsible for the pneumonia, she needs criteria by which she can 
assess the evidence available. For example, even if the temperature and blood oxygen levels 
are borderline, Dr Clarke is likely to err towards a positive diagnosis. She will apply the 
criteria of care, insofar as she would rather be wrong about a positive diagnosis than she 
would about a negative diagnosis. Dr Clarke’s diagnosis that Mary has pneumonia could be 
considered reasonable or even conventional by modern medical standards, but it nonetheless 
is not simply an objective fact. Care is a value that informs normative judgements about how 
to reason. Privileging competing values, such as societal cost-effectiveness or prioritisation of 
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young patients, could have led to a different ‘fact’ about whether Mary has pneumonia. Put 
this way, it seems clear that even this situation, which we first thought simply related to 
medical data, involves (or presupposes) evaluative considerations, which are not mere 
preference, but rather judgements based on experience. Data and values, it seems, are 
interwoven. In our example, we might say that the value judgement confers diagnostic status 
on or provides relevance criteria for the data obtained from the thermometer and the 
oximeter. Values are involved in the determination of what is treated as a medical fact. 
Returning to example (2), involving Jim, further shows that data, fact, and value might 
not be so easily disentangled. Autosomal dominant polycystic kidney disease is caused by a 
genetic fault that causes cysts to grow in the kidneys. A child has a 50 percent chance of 
developing the disease if one of their parents has the faulty gene. There is currently no 
treatment to stop it developing but symptoms do not generally occur until later in life. 
Screening is available but is not entirely accurate and may not detect the disease. A key 
component in Jim’s decision to inform his children might, therefore, be the quality of the 
screening available. The decision depends on the quality of the medical evidence available 
and the ability to act on that evidence were it to be of decent quality. If the tests are unreliable 
and the treatment often ineffective, then this will figure in Jim’s deliberations. Jim’s ‘moral 
end’, his ethical objectives, might be shifted by the means available to achieve that end or 
realise those objectives. Arriving here, we were right to see that there is something like an 
ethical component in this situation, but at the same time we want to say that it is less clear 
now that ‘component’ is the right term. For our observations have brought out the extent to 
which values and data are not merely intertwined, like two discreet but tangled threads, but 
serve to confer status and situational relevance on each other. Value judgements about the 
role of medicine confer diagnostic status and relevance criteria to Mary’s data. Knowledge 
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about the accuracy of tests, and the ability to cure the kidney disease, frame Jim’s moral 
deliberations in ways that have direct bearing on the outcome of those deliberations. 
Arriving at this point in our reflections, we have moved away from the common 
thought with which we opened, of medical and ethical modes of thought being different in 
kind, with different criteria for expertise. As we remarked at the outset, this served to 
complicate clinical situations because it meant thinking ethically involved a new way of 
thinking, which in turn demanded additional – ethical – training. However, having reflected 
on our examples, and having seen the extent to which the medical and the ethical are 
intertwined and mutually transformative, the question is raised as to how we should now 
conceive the merely medical situation. Our picture of the ethics complicating such situations 
was predicated on the optionality of ethics in clinical situations, whereas we now see, based 
on our examples, that far from being additive the ethical is already interwoven into the 
medical: the good doctor already delicately weaves the ethical and the medical in the exercise 
of their distinctively clinical practical judgement. It seems we had better back up and ask a 
simpler question, “What is a medical situation?” 
2. What is a medical situation? 
The blurring of medical and ethical modes of thought has made it more difficult to analyse 
clearly what is distinctively medical. It can be difficult to know how to proceed except to 
look at some more situations we think of as clinical. 
(3) Mal has a follow-up appointment with his oncologist, Dr Powell. He has recently 
been diagnosed with thyroid cancer, which has spread from his thyroid gland to other parts of 
his neck and nearby lymph nodes. Mal is in his mid-70s and otherwise healthy and active for 
his age. 
“How are you holding up Mal?” asks Dr Powell. 
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“Alright doc, you know. Just want to talk through the treatment options today really.” 
“Sure. As we discussed, the first thing we need to do is remove the gland and some 
lymph nodes. We will then employ radiation therapy after the surgery.” 
“Right, I see, yep. I’ve been doing a bit of reading on this doc, about some alternative 
treatments.” 
“Right, yes, sure. Some of those treatments can be really useful to cope with side 
effects. A couple of my patients have really benefited from acupuncture, for example. I think 
that could be a good idea Mal.” 
“No, sorry doc. I don’t mean that. A friend of mine knew someone who had exactly 
what I have and cured it using natural medicines, without all this dangerous radiation. I’m 
getting on as it is doc – I don’t want my last years spent laid up in a hospital bed getting 
zapped.” 
(4) Shami is in her mid-60s and books an appointment to see her doctor, Dr Gopal. 
Shami has been forgetting things recently and is worried what this might mean, especially as 
her late father suffered from dementia. After a short examination and discussion – all they 
have time for in this consultation – Shami wants to talk more about what the prognosis could 
be and what this might mean for her. However, Dr Gopal deflects this discussion, instead 
focussing on the evidence that, “only about 5 percent of people with mild cognitive 
impairment such as you seem to have will progress to dementia each year. And about 60 
percent of people do not see their cognitive function decline further – some may even 
improve.” 
In example (3), Dr Powell initially considers that, as the survival rate for thyroid cancer 
is much better than for another advanced cancers, there does not seem much debate on the 
correct treatment approach. When Mal introduces the idea of alternative treatments, Dr 
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Powell assumes Mal means to complement the standard approach of modern medicine or 
‘allopathic medicine’. On hearing Mal means such treatments as a replacement, it is 
reasonable to assume that Dr Powell’s task is to persuade Mal that he has made a mistake. 
However, although it may be that Mal is mistaken about the biological effects of alternative 
treatments for thyroid cancer, there are other, more understandable, criteria to consider. Mal 
talks of not wanting to be laid-up in a hospital bed. He may fear that by undergoing a long 
period of modern medical treatment of surgery followed by radiotherapy with associated 
deleterious side effects, he will miss out on what little time he has left with his grandchildren. 
Even if Mal can be persuaded that the standard treatment is the right approach, this decision 
will include weighing up factors such as the effect on his quality of life, which is influenced 
by his personal and family circumstances, what he considers important, and how he views the 
way in which he wants to approach what is left of his life. Any treatment decision must thus 
involve decisions that we ordinarily conceive of as ethical. In line with our prior reflections, 
if we consider the situation coherently we cannot easily separate the medical from the ethical. 
If we want the ‘mere’ medical situation – where we think of ‘the medical’ as a clinical 
situation stripped of all ethical considerations – it seems we must actively disregard the 
ethical in some way. In example (4), the medical and ethical again seem entangled; there is 
some uncertainty and Shami is understandably worried about what might be happening. In 
this instance, Dr Gopal could herself be interpreted as actively disregarding (or at least 
postponing) the ethical by focussing on the available prognostic statistics. In this example, 
therefore, we see that the process of actively disregarding the ethical is not just something 
one can do when trying to make sense of an abstract situation, but an activity one can do to 
make sense of an ongoing situation one is involved in. 
In examples (3) and (4), the merely medical situation does not appear by itself; it is 
only made manifest by actively disregarding, trying to strip away, the ethical in some way. 
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Another way to put this is that the situation is made medical by regarding it from a particular, 
medical but not ethical, perspective. But what sort of perspective is ‘medical but not ethical’? 
We cannot invoke ‘fact’ or ‘value’ as intelligibly separate perspectives because we have 
made clear the two are inextricably entangled. One answer that springs to mind is that to 
regard a situation as medical-but-not-ethical is to regard it from a purely biological 
perspective. Perhaps here is an answer that seems to make sense. A situation is merely 
medical when one explains it from a biological perspective, thereby highlighting its 
biological aspects and overlooking the ethical aspects. 
We belatedly have a picture to get us started. Merely medical situations occur in the 
biological order of things – i.e. they are conceived as biomedical – grounded in our complex 
and sophisticated understanding of science; they are only made possible by adopting such a 
perspective, under what we could call an aspect. It is clear that this picture is different to the 
picture we started with. We started this paper with a picture that depicted medical situations 
as primary, made more complex by an additional ethical component. What we now see is 
something like the converse: we need some considerable education to make sense of a 
medical situation. To see a situation under a purely biomedical aspect requires training. When 
we began, we wanted to place the messy and unresolvable ethical component on top of the 
clearer, resolvable medical one. But now it seems that if we want the ethical we cannot start 
from the medical. If we ask, out of the blue, “What is the additional ethical component?”, we 
get misled. Asking this question assumes that the ethical is something discrete and additional 
to the medical. Whereas the medical is merely an aspect of the situation – which too has an 
integral ethical aspect – made possible by the biological perspective which is accessed by 
having undergone significant formal training (going to medical school), and then being 
motivated to view the situation in such a way (needing to diagnose and treat the patient). This 
will not give us a starting point from which to add an additional ethical component; such an 
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aspect is one from which an ethical component could not arise. We must, therefore, change 
the question again and instead ask simply, “What is an ethical situation?” 
3. What is an ethical situation? 
In trying to answer this question, let us consider our examples from the simpler standpoint of 
aspects. In looking at Mary’s case, seeing the ethical aspect involves considering how Dr 
Clarke conceives of and values the role of medicine in society. In Jim’s case, it involves 
being attuned to how his consideration of his situation foregrounds his relationship with his 
daughters, notably his desire to shield them from harm and discomfort. In Mal’s case, it 
involves considering his personal and family circumstances, and how he assesses the wider 
effects of treatment on his quality of life. And in Shami’s case, it involves understanding how 
her experience of caring for her father influences how she evaluates symptoms and interacts 
with her doctor. 
Thinking through these examples, we see that an ethical situation is grounded in 
particular, everyday concerns, which are often resolved in a shared and negotiated cultural 
background [8].i The ethical is thus merely an aspect of the situation made clear by the 
everyday perspective afforded to us as individuals living with one another in society. Our 
difficulty at the outset was thinking of ‘ethics’ and ‘values’ as philosophical words, used in a 
very theoretical or general way. Given that seeing a situation under a medical aspect requires 
specialised biological knowledge acquired through training, clinicians can most usefully 
regard a situation in that way. But such training does not have to estrange clinicians from 
everyday human concerns, such that they think ethical situations complex and uncertain, and 
medical situations clear and distinct. A misleading position could be developed through 
 
i A similar common-sense position on ethics can be interpreted in recent work on person-centred care. Although 
initial versions of the framework have been critiqued for being overly individualistic (see [9] for a critique), 
recent versions focus on intersubjective relationships and interactions, rather than individual persons [10]. 
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medical training because ethical decisions are often discussed in suspiciously unscientific 
terms, whilst medical decisions are often discussed in a more straightforward, scientific way. 
But, as is too obvious to note, clinicians encounter life’s challenges just as their patients do; 
in any case, any such perception would soon be discharged on contact with clinical practice. 
This is not to say that clinicians are, by virtue of being fellow citizens, experts in their 
patients’ lives. Given the prevalent socio-cultural differences between clinicians (notably 
doctors) and many of their patients, this is manifestly not the case. However, these barriers, 
we argue, are not overcome by recourse to and application of an ethical theory, but by 
clinicians cultivating a greater understanding of and sensitivity towards their patients’ 
everyday lives [11].ii This cultivation – something most clinicians would readily agree with – 
could be promoted by adapting the teaching of ethics in medical schools. Rather than 
presenting the notion of ‘thinking ethically’ as a process informed by the application of and 
reflection on the competing merits of special principles, more focus could be given to 
activities that ground ethics in everyday human concerns; for example, providing more 
exposure to patient accounts of their own illness experience, more opportunities for active 
rehearsal and improvisation in simulated clinical settings, and more exposure to medical 
literature and theatre [12,13]. 
4. Different aspects not a difference in kind 
Inverting our starting position, we could, if pushed, view the medical mode of thought 
complex and specialised, and the ethical one plain and simple. But perhaps we do not even 
want to say that because this distinction is given to us by the misleading picture we adopted 
at the outset. Medical and ethical modes of thought do not differ in kind, they are merely 
 
ii Importantly, our argument should not be interpreted as proposing a general definition of ethics or the ethical. 
Instead, we just conclude that when talking about the ‘medical’ and the ‘ethical’ in a clinical situation it is useful 
to conceive of the former as seeing the situation under a biological aspect and the latter as seeing the situation 
under a human, everyday aspect. 
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different aspects of what it means to be human. Clinicians are uniquely positioned to 
synthesise these two aspects – without prior knowledge of philosophical ethics – because 
they are able to see ethical situations in medical situations and vice versa. That is where the 
ethical action is in the clinic.iii 
 
 
iii The title and philosophical approach of this paper are inspired by Frank Ebersole’s essay, ‘Where the action 
is’. [14]  
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